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A CRITIQUE OF THE ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY SYLLOGISM
GEORGE C. THOMAS III*
One strand of feminist thought is that the dramatic increase in
rape rates during the 1970s and 1980s manifested the control men
have over women's bodies.' Some feminists also see this control
manifested in the creation and consumption of pornography.2 To
these individuals it is almost axiomatic that the two manifestations
of male control over women are causally linked. This view can be
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark. B.S., University of
Tennessee, 1968; M.F.A, University of Iowa, 1972; J.D., 1975; LL.M., Washington Uni-
versity, 1984; J.S.D., 1986. I wish particularly to thank Professor David Edelman, Uni-
versity of Sydney, Sydney, Australia, for his assistance on the multiple regression
analyses presented in this paper. Professor Edelman confirmed my early calculations by
using a more sophisticated computer program. His figures, which differed slightly from
mine, are the ones used in the paper, and I wish to give him credit for them. I also wish
to thank Larry Baron, David Fried, David Jaffee, and Lynn Miller for helpful comments
on an earlier version of the paper. Terry Silpe and Anne Amann functioned as demand-
ing, but helpful, editors. I also want to thank those who helped me gather or analyze the
data. A partial list includes Dory Dickman, Tony Paulazzo, Tony Vignier, Marjorie
Crawford, Nina Ford, the Audit Bureau of Circulations, and Adult Video News. The
Rutgers S.I. Newhouse Faculty Research Fund provided financial assistance. I presented
an earlier form of this paper as the 1990 Annual Law and Criminal Justice Lecture,
jointly sponsored by Rutgers School of Law-Newark and Rutgers Graduate School of
Criminal Justice, and I benefited from the responses of faculty and students.
1. See Martha R. Burt, Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE:
THE HIDDEN CRIME 37 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991) ("Rape and the
threat of male violence are one of patriarchy's mechanisms for maintaining male con-
trol."); ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 203 (1989) ("The
sexual colonialization of women's bodies is a material reality: men control the sexual
and reproductive uses of women's bodies. The institutions of control include ... sys-
tematized physical aggression against women (for instance, in rape and battery)."); AN-
DREA MEDEA & KATHLEEN THOMPSON, AGAINST RAPE 125 (1974) ("The basic principle
around which [feminist anti-rape groups] were organized ... was simply this: that rape
is... a crime against women that is encouraged by a sexist society; that women are seen,
in our culture, not as whole human beings, but as objects and authorized victims of male
aggression."); Larry Baron & Murray A. Straus, Sexual Stratification, Pornography, and Rape
in the United States, in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION 185, 185-86 (Neil M.
Malamuth & Edward Donnerstein eds., 1984) (discussing the feminist view that rape is
"an expression of a patriarchical (male dominated) social system").
2. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 25 ("Male power is the raison d'tre of por-
nography; the degradation of the female is the means of achieving this power."); Laura
Lederer, Introduction to TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 19-20 (Laura Lederer ed., 1980) (conclud-
ing that "pornography is the ideology of a culture which promotes and condones rape,
woman-battering, and other crimes of violence against women"); CATHARINE A. MACK-
INNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 146 (1987) (viewing pornography as "[clentral to institu-
tionalization of male dominance"). For a brief discussion of the definition of
pornography, see infra note 65 and accompanying text.
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roughly expressed in the following "anti-pornography" syllogism:
the belief that it is permissible for men to control women sexually is
a significant cause of rape; pornography teaches men that it is per-
missible to control women sexually; therefore, pornography is a sig-
nificant cause of rape.3
For empirical "proof" of the syllogism, proponents rely on the
escalating rape rates during the 1970s and 1980s, which were, after
all, a period of more pervasive and more explicit pornography.4
This "proof" of a causal link has increased the pressure to ban or
restrict pornography as a means of reducing rape rates.5 For exam-
ple, the Canadian Supreme Court recently used a variation of the
anti-pornography syllogism as part of its rationale to create a broad
definition of material banned by Canada's obscenity law.6 A bill
pending before the United States Senate is even more explicit in
accepting a causal link between pornography and rape.7 The bill
3. See Larry Baron & Murray A. Straus, Four Theories of Rape: A Macrosociological Anal-
ysis, 34 Soc. PROBS. 467, 468 (1987) ("Some feminists theorize that pornography causes
men to rape women.").
4. See infra Part II.
5. One response to this pressure was a model anti-pornography statute fashioned
by two prominent feminist scholars, Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon. See
DONALD A. DOWNS, THE NEW POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY 44, 114-15 (1989). Under the
MacKinnon-Dworkin model, individuals directly harmed by pornographic materials can
recover damages in a private action against those who profit or benefit from the pornog-
raphy. See MAcKINNON, supra note 2, at 179-86 (discussing causes of action for (1) co-
erced participation in the creation of pornography; (2) forced exposure to pornography
at home, in school, in the work place or in any other public area; (3) attack or physical
assault directly caused by specific pornography; and (4) "trafficking" in pornography).
The statute, which draws heavily on the psychological research supporting the anti-por-
nography syllogism, eventually became the basis for municipal ordinances in Minneapo-
lis and Indianapolis. DowNs, supra, at xi-xiii. Unlike previous obscenity laws, which
focused on the moral harm caused by pornography, these ordinances are directed at
protecting the civil rights of women. Id. at xi. While neither ordinance survived consti-
tutional challenge, see American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th
Cir. 1985) (striking down the Indianapolis ordinance on First Amendment grounds),
aff'd mem. 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); DOWNS, supra, at 62 (discussing Mayor Fraser's veto of
the Minneapolis ordinance on First Amendment grounds), a similar statute introduced
in the Massachusetts legislature has renewed interest in this type of anti-pornography
legislation. See Ma. H.B. 5194, 177th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (1992); Tamar Lewin, Anti-
Pornography Proposal Re-emerges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1992, § 1, at 16 (discussing the pub-
lic debate over the Massachusetts bill); see also infra notes 7-8 and accompanying text
(discussing a similar Senate bill).
6. See Butler v. The Queen, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 509-10 (concluding that while
pornography is protected by the right of free expression, the potential harm to women
would justify banning material that is "degrading or dehumanizing"). While the Cana-
dian Supreme Court stopped short of postulating a causal link between pornography
and rape, it did mention the "threat to equality resulting from exposure to audiences of
certain types of violent and degrading material." Id. at 497.
7. See S. 1521, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (2d version, Aug. 14, 1992).
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permits victims of sexual violence to recover damages from produ-
cers and sellers of pornography based on proof, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the pornography was a "substantial cause of
the offense."'
In this Article, I will focus on the anti-pornography syllogism
and its chief proof-the escalating rape rates of the past two de-
cades. I will make two criticisms. First, it is far from clear that rape
rates escalated during the last two decades; instead, they may have
declined.' Second, no available scientific evidence establishes a
causal relationship between pornography and rape. The second
point is controversial and complex.' ° Nonetheless, despite statisti-
cal uncertainties, the evidence that I will discuss of a lack of causal
link is more persuasive than the evidence to the contrary. The sta-
tistical evidence presented in this Article, therefore, makes the con-
clusion of the anti-pornography syllogism untenable, at least until
other evidence is found.
The policy question of whether to ban pornography has dimen-
sions that exist independently of the anti-pornography syllogism.
Some oppose pornography not because it increases the risk of phys-
ical harm to women, but because it is morally wrong in itself." I Sim-
ilarly, one could accept the anti-pornography syllogism and still
resist (as some feminists do) the corollary call to ban pornography
on essentially libertarian grounds.1 2 Finally, much of the feminist
8. Id. § 3(b)(3). The bill is silent, however, on the type of proof that would estab-
lish "substantial cause." Presumably, that issue is left to the jury.
9. See infra Part I.
10. A threshold question is what it means to "establish" a causal link. See infra Part
III. Given the uncertainty that accompanies statistical efforts to prove cause-and-effect,
allocating the burden of proof is likely to be decisive. An ancillary issue involves the
level of proof constituting requisite certainty. As statistical proof is fraught with uncer-
tainty, I would tentatively set the level at preponderance of the evidence, rather than a
heightened civil standard like clear and convincing evidence or the rigorous criminal
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. This is the standard set forth in Senate Bill
1521. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. The 1986 Commission on Pornogra-
phy rejected legal terminology for the standard of proof on this issue in favor of "ordi-
nary language" terms such as "convinced," "satisfied," and "concluded." See U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 309
(1986) [hereinafter MEESE COMMISSION).
11. I deal here only with pornography that depicts adult models. The policy reasons
for banning child pornography are much more compelling. Indeed, the federal law re-
stricting child pornography makes no concessions to First Amendment concerns and
contains severe penalties. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (providing for fines
of up to $100,000, imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both, for first-time offenders).
12. See, e.g., DOWNS, supra note 1, at 51 (noting that anti-censorship feminists op-
posed a Minneapolis ordinance which sought to create a cause of action against
pornographers for harm caused by pornography).
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thought on pornography is not dependent on the anti-pornography
syllogism. For example, the work of Catharine MacKinnon and An-
drea Dworkin cannot be captured by any crude instrumental claim
that pornography causes discrete harm. Their work is a philosophi-
cal attack on what they view as male construction of sexuality and
gender. '3
By focusing on the broader question of the construction of
identity, MacKinnon and Dworkin condemn the harm caused by
pornography's existence, without regard to any instrumental effects
it might have. 4 Nonetheless, both MacKinnon and Dworkin have
used their gender theory to help develop legislation that would per-
mit damage suits against the producers and creators of pornography
for physical harm "caused" by the pornography.' 5 Thus, while the
theory of MacKinnon and Dworkin does not depend on the claim
that pornography causes physical harm, it appears to encompass
that claim.
Moreover, less visionary theories that seek to justify a ban on
pornography do crucially depend on the claim that some pornogra-
phy is harmful.' 6 Because the causal link to harm is central to some
anti-pornography theories and consistent with others, I wish to ex-
amine it more carefully than most of its adherents have done by fo-
cusing on the causal link between pornography and rape. I take no
position, however, on feminism's thorough-going critique of por-
nography's effects on the construction of sexuality and gender, or
on the question of whether pornography should be more or less
widely available, thus leaving for others these philosophical and pol-
icy questions.
I will first examine the twin empirical propositions that both
13. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 1; MAcKINNON, supra note 2. For an excellent dis-
cussion of the Dworkin-MacKinnon position on pornography, see DOWNS, supra note 5,
at 37-42.
14. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 130 (noting that pornography is one way
the reality of male dominance "is imposed as well as experienced" so that "when a man
looks at a pornographic picture-pornographic meaning that the woman is defined to be
acted upon, a sexual object, a sexual thing-the viewing is an act, an act of male
supremacy").
15. See supra note 5; see also DOWNS, supra note 5, at 34-94 (describing involvement of
Dworkin and MacKinnon in seeking passage of the Minneapolis ordinance); Lewin, supra
note 5, at 16 (noting MacKinnon's support for a similar Massachusetts bill).
16. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE LJ. 589,
626 (noting that the case for anti-pornography regulation "depends on simultaneous
beliefs that pornography produces significant harms and that those harms cannot be
alleviated through public debate alone"); see also id. at 594-602 (detailing Sunstein's per-
ception of the harm caused by violent pornography).
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rape rates' 7 and pornography consumption dramatically increased
in the 1970s and 1980s. I will then turn to more specialized evi-
dence on the causation question.' 9 In that section, I will present
new evidence that undermines earlier claims that a causal link be-
tween rape and pornography exists.
I. RAPE RATEs: ESCALATING, HOLDING STEADY, OR DECLINING?
Two federal agencies collect data on rape rates in the United
States: the FBI and the Department ofJustice. Both use essentially
the same definition of rape and include attempted as well as com-
pleted rapes in their reported statistics. 2' The FBI publishes its data
as the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR); these data, compiled state by
state, are based on reported rapes2' and, thus, necessarily under-
state the true rate to the extent that rapes are not reported to the
police. The Department ofJustice, on the other hand, draws its data
from the National Crime Survey (NCS) of a random sample of
households selected to reflect the nation as a whole, a procedure
which should better estimate the true rate of rape in the country.22
The NCS compilation also differs from the UCR data by separately
identifying "stranger" and "non-stranger" rapes as component
parts of its total rape rate.23 All four measures are included in the
following table as rapes per 1000 population.24
17. See infra Part I.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See FBI, 1990 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 15 (1991) (defining forcible rape as "the
carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will . . . [including] [a]ssaults or
attempts to commit rape by force or threat of force"); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1973-88
TRENDS 93 (1991) [hereinafter CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION: 1973-88 TRENDS] (defining
rape as -[c]arnal knowledge through the use of force or the threat of force, including
attempts").
21. See FBI, supra note 20, at 1-4.
22. See CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION: 1973-88 TRENDS, supra note 20, at iii ("The NCS is
able to provide an estimate of criminal victimization over time because of the numerous
respondents who help to make it the second largest continuous survey in the United
States.").
23. See id. at 93-94 (defining "stranger" as one whom the victim "identifies... as a
stranger, did not see or recognize .... or knew... only by sight" and "non-stranger" as
"[a]n offender who is either related to, well known to, or casually acquainted with the
victim").
24. While the Bureau of Justice Statistics rounds its rates to the nearest one-tenth,
the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) rates, which are based on a much larger sample, can
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For two reasons, the rates in Table 1 do not reflect a woman's
true risk of rape. First, the NCS and UCR population bases include
males; because rape victims are women in all but a few cases, the
rate per 1000 females would be roughly twice the rate shown.26
More importantly, even the survey-derived NCS data may be
missing a large number of actual rapes. A new survey using a
different questioning technique estimated five times the number of
rapes estimated by the NCS.27 However, the project undertaken in
25. The "stranger" and "non-stranger" rates do not always add up to the National
Crime Survey (NCS) total because of rounding. For example, if the "stranger" and
"non-stranger" figures in 1976 were .57 and .27, respectively, they would round to .60
and .30, but the total (.84) would round to .80.
26. Women constitute 100% of UCR rape victims. See FBI, supra note 20, at 15
(defining rape as forcible sex with a female). Women constitute an average of 92% of
the rape victims in the NCS data set from 1973-1988. See CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION:
1973-88 TRENDS, supra note 20, at 15 (showing a range of 87% in 1980 to 98% in 1974).
Thus, for purposes of roughly estimating the risk of rape, males can be excluded from
the population base, effectively doubling the risk for women. The minuscule
representation of males among rape victims in the NCS data also justifies the convention
of referring to the perpetrator as male and the victim as female.
27. See David Johnston, Survey Shows Number of Rapes Far Higher Than Official Figures,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1992, at A14.
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this Article is not dependent on a close approximation of the true
rape rate in any given year. Instead, it depends on making the best
estimates over the past two decades of the true trends in rape rates.
Even if the NCS data underestimate the actual rape rates by a large
factor, they could still accurately depict the true trend of rapes if the
estimated rates bear the same relationship to the actual rates over
time. For example, if the NCS estimates routinely miss half the
rapes, the NCS total rates in Table 1 would tell us that a woman's
true risk of rape in 1990 was between two-tenths and three-tenths of
one percent,28 but that, since 1981, the rate had declined
substantially.
Because only the UCR and NCS provide data over several
years, they are the inevitable source for ascertaining the trend in
rape rates. Yet, as Table 1 illustrates, the two sets of data are
inconsistent. The long-term trend in UCR rates is clearly up,
increasing by over seventy percent from 1973 to 1990, but the trend
in NCS "stranger" and total rates over the same period is just as
clearly down.29 While the NCS "non-stranger" rates have not
fallen, they have remained quite constant, with the 1988-1990
average precisely the same as the 1973-1975 average."0
Table 1 further discloses that the NCS rates are always
substantially higher than the UCR rates. Presumably, this difference
is attributable to the NCS identifying rapes that were not reported
to the police.3 ' If so, Table 1 suggests that a much larger
percentage of rapes were reported in recent years. In 1973, only
one-third of all rapes estimated by the NCS appear in the UCR
reported rape data.3 2 By contrast, almost four-fifths of 1990 NCS
28. The 1990 total rate of .6 must be doubled, under this assumption, to reflect the
missing rapes and then doubled again to reflect a woman's risk rather than the generic
risk of a citizen. See supra note 26. This produces a risk of 2.4 per 1,000.
29. The average "stranger" rate for the period 1988-1990 is down 50% from the
average for the period 1973-1975. The average total rate for these periods is down by
about 30%.
30. It is preferable to average NCS rates over a two- or three-year period to smooth
out anomalies caused by rounding the rates. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
Intermediate-term trends are also inconsistent between the two studies. The UCR rate
rose markedly through the 1970s while NCS "stranger" rates held constant. The UCR
rate reached a plateau in the 1980s when the NCS "stranger" rates were declining
sharply.
31. But see Robert M. O'Brien, Metropolitan Structure and Violent Crime: Which Measure of
Crime?, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 434, 436 n.7 (1983) (noting that "crimes which are recorded in
police records are often not reported by interviewees to the NCS interviewers").
32. The UCR and NCS rates cannot be directly compared because they are
computed from different total populations. The UCR use the entire United States
population, while NCS uses the population age 12 and above. See FBI, supra note 20, at
[VOL. 52:122
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rapes appear in the UCR rates. 3
If the reporting rate increased by something of this magnitude,
it would explain why the UCR and NCS rates appear to be moving
in different directions.3 4 Unfortunately, other NCS data are
inconsistent with this hypothesis. The NCS keeps records of the
rate at which the crimes disclosed in its survey were reported to
police; although these figures show year-to-year variations for
reporting rapes, they do not show a trend that would explain the
difference between NCS and UCR rates.3 5
Another explanation for the discordant trends is that either the
NCS data or the UCR data, or both, are simply inaccurate. Other
than differences in the year-to-year rate at which citizens report
crimes, the UCR and NCS data could be inaccurate in two ways.
First, the information that citizens offer to the police or in response
to the survey could be exaggerated, minimized, or simply false,
52; CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION: 1973-88 TRENDS, supra note 20, at iii. After adjusting for
the different population bases, however, total rapes shown by the UCR figures (51,000)
for 1973 are about 33% of the total rapes estimated by NCS (156,000). See FBI, 1973
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1 (1974); CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION: 1973-88 TRENDS, Supra
note 20, at 15.
33. Again adjusting for different population bases, see supra note 32, the UCR
number of reported rapes (103,000) for 1990 is 79% of the NCS estimate (130,000). See
FBI, supra note 20, at 15; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990, 16 (1992) [hereinafter CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 1990].
34. Assume, for example, that the true rape rate in 1973 was 2.0 occurrences per
1000 population. The UCR rate of .24 occurrences for that year would translate into a
reporting rate of 12%. Assume now that the true rape rate in 1990 fell from 2.0 to 1.3
occurrences but the reporting rate increased to 31.5%. This would cause the UCR rape
rate to rise to .41 (as actually reported) even though the true rate had fallen by the
magnitude suggested by the NCS data. Thus, assuming that the NCS rates represent a
consistent percentage of actual rates, a large increase in the reporting rate could
reconcile the UCR and NCS data. The inevitable implication of this reconciliation, of
course, is that the NCS data offer a better picture of the true rape rates over time.
35. The percentage of rapes disclosed in the NCS survey that were reported to the
police were as follows:
Rapes Rapes
Year Reported Year Reported
1973 44% 1982 53%
1974 52% 1983 47%
1975 56% 1984 56%
1976 53% 1985 61%
1977 51% 1986 48%
1978 49% 1987 53%
1979 50% 1988 45%
1980 42% 1989 51%
1981 56% 1990 54%
1993]
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leading to an inaccurate categorization of the events that occurred.
Second, the police (or survey) categorization of even accurate
information could be erroneous. There is no reason, however, to
believe that either type of error occurs in other than a random
fashion."6 The trend in rape rates should not be affected by random
categorization errors. 7
Unlike the UCR data, the NCS data are based on a sample
drawn from a larger universe and are, therefore, subject to sampling
error-the possibility that the sample may not accurately represent
the universe."8 While the expected NCS sampling error could be
relatively large in any given year,3 9 the sampling error would also
occur randomly. As random sampling error would show higher-
than-actual rates in some years and lower-than-actual rates in other,
it is extremely unlikely that over a ten- or fifteen-year period
random error would always show fewer rapes than actually
occurred.4" Thus, the difference between the NCS and UCR rates
cannot be dismissed as sampling error.
A related possible NCS error is peculiar to rape. Because rape
is a relatively rare crime compared to the other crimes for which the
NCS collects data, 4' the rate of rapes per 1000 population is small.
As a result, a small change in the number of rapes can be lost in
rounding the rape rates to the nearest one-tenth.42 On balance,
however, the rounding effect is likely to be insignificant when
36. Baron and Straus "tested" the UCR rape data in several ways and concluded that
the UCR figures do not contain large nonrandom errors. See Baron & Straus, supra note
1, at 202-04.
37. See George C. Thomas III & David Edelman, An Evaluation of Conservative Crime
Control Theology, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 123, 142 (1988) (stating that "[u]sual (random)
errors in reporting will cancel each other out in long time periods").
38. See CRIMINAL VICIMIZATbON, 1990, supra note 33, at 141-47 (discussing NCS
survey methodology and standard errors).
39. See id. at 146 (computing the sampling error for a subcategory of robbery rates,
12.3 per 1000, and finding it 95% likely that the true rate was between 9.1 and 15.5 per
1000).
40. See supra Table 1 (showing that in every year from 1973 to 1990 the UCR rates
were substantially lower than the total NCS rate).
41. See CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION: 1973-88 TRENDS, supra note 20, at 1-5. The other
crimes in the NCS survey are robbery, assault, personal larceny, burglary, household
larceny, and motor vehicle theft. See id. Of the UCR crimes, murder is the only crime
more rare than rape. See FBI, supra note 20, at 52-53. The NCS does not collect data on
murder. See CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION: 1973-88 TRENDS, supra note 20, at iii.
42. Consider the Table 1 "non-stranger" rate. It is extremely unlikely that the true
rate was exactly .30 for 13 of the 18 years of the NCS data collection. The true rate
during these 13 years could have varied from .251 to .350 and still have been rounded
off to .3. A rate of .350 is roughly 40% higher than a rate of .251. Thus, a significant
increase or decrease from year to year can be hidden by the rounding effect.
[VOL. 52:122
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looking at long-term averages over a seventeen-year period. The
average "stranger" rate from the period 1982-1990 was thirty-nine
percent below the average for the period 1973-1981. 4s Again, it is
the trend that counts, and the downward trend in the NCS
"stranger" rate is clear enough from Table 1. It is very unlikely that
the NCS rate would decrease by thirty-nine percent if the total UCR
increase from 1973 to 1990 of seventy percent 44 represented the true
rate.
A more likely, though partial, explanation for the divergent
trends derives from the UCR aggregation of "stranger" and "non-
stranger" rapes into a total figure. It is possible that our culture's
definition of rape, when committed by a "non-stranger," has
become more inclusive over the last twenty years. If so, more recent
UCR rates would include acts of intercourse that would not appear
in earlier rates, and any comparison of UCR rates over time would
therefore be flawed. But the NCS data, which disaggregate these
rape categories, would not be affected by a change in the definition
of one category.
Table 1 provides threshold support for this hypothesis. Note
that "stranger" rapes as reported by NCS fell sharply while "non-
stranger" rapes held in a narrow range. If the overall rape rate,
based on 1973 definitions, were falling while our culture
simultaneously broadened the definition of "non-stranger" rape,
the rates would look like the NCS data. Before this hypothesis can
be accepted, however, we must have a plausible explanation of how
and why the definition of "non-stranger" rape has changed.
The legal definition of rape used by the UCR and the NCS is
essentially the same as that used by Blackstone two centuries ago-
"the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will." '45
But the key issue in separating rape from other carnal knowledge is
force that vitiates consent; was the intercourse, in Blackstone's
words, "against her will"? It is likely that cultural views of what
43. The averages are .64 and .40, respectively. See Table 1. Averaging the rates
tends to reduce rounding error because the actual rates will fall randomly both above
and below the rounded figure. For example, if the actual "non-stranger" rate is .252
one year and .348 the next year, both rates round to .3. And, in this example, the actual
average is also .3. Thus, if the sample is large enough, the average of the rounded rates
will come very close to the actual average.
44. The UCR rape rate moved from a low of .24 in 1973 to a high of .41 in 1990-a
70% increase. See supra Table 1.
45. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210. Compare FBI, supra note 20, at
15 ("the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will") with CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION: 1973-88 TRENDS, supra note 20, at 93 ("[c]arnal knowledge through the
use of force or the threat of force").
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constitutes forcible sex change over time." Blackstone noted, for
example, that Roman law considered prostitutes incapable of being
raped, but that English law was different because "by crying out [the
prostitute] showed herself unwilling to consent" to the sex act.47
A more modern example is the apparent change in the
definition of acquaintance rape between 1981 and 1992. In a 1981
survey, respondents were asked whether, in varying hypothetical
dating scenarios, the man raped the woman, and whether what he
did was wrong." The woman clearly expressed her nonconsent to
sexual relations eight times in the various scenarios, and the man
always ignored her demand that he desist his sexual advances.49 In
one scenario, while ninety-two percent of the respondents said what
the man did was wrong, only fifty-eight percent said that a rape had
occurred. 50  Apparently, no significant differences existed in the
responses of men and women. 5' The researchers concluded that
our culture perceived a category of conduct "where the man's
behavior is considered wrong, but the situation is not defined as
rape."5 2 But when I repeated this survey in 1992, using a somewhat
different group of subjects,53 the intermediate category of conduct
disclosed by that particular scenario had apparently all but
disappeared. Ninety-seven percent of the respondents said that the
act in the scenario was rape and one hundred percent said that it
was wrong.
46. See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1187-91
(1985) (noting that " [c]onsent is a construct of interpretive activity" which changes over
time).
47. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *212-13 (quoting Bracton).
48. See R. Lance Shotland & Lynne Goodstein,Just Because She Doesn't Want To Doesn't
Mean It's Rape: An Experimentally Based Causal Model of the Perception of Rape in a Dating
Situation, 46 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 220, 222-24 (1983).
49. Id. at 222-23.
50. Id. at 226 thl. 3 (reporting responses to a scenario where the woman made verbal
and physical protest early in the encounter and the man used a low degree of force).
51. The researchers mentioned a possible gender difference only with respect to
whether the respondents blamed the woman for the sex act, but concluded that no
difference existed. Id. at 229-30.
52. Id. at 226.
53. Results of author's study on file with the Maryland Law Review. The 1992 group
was the first-year class at Rutgers Law School; the 1981 group was composed of
introductory psychology students at the Pennsylvania State University. See Shotland &
Goodstein, supra note 48, at 222. The different compositions of the groups may, of
course, be wholly or partially responsible for the different results. But the law students
surveyed had not yet studied rape law, and no self-evident characteristic of law students
and psychology students suggests that the former would be more likely to define a sex
act as rape. Both groups were roughly 50% male and 50% female. Id.; law school
group: 55% male.
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Although this single finding is hardly conclusive, two tentative
inferences seem permissible. First, some women in 1981, and
presumably in earlier years, might not have viewed sex as rape even
though they had manifested their nonconsent. Indeed, the 1981
researchers found that women were as likely as men to blame the
hypothetical woman for the sex act that occurred.54 Second, the
1992 survey suggests that this attitude has probably changed over
the last decade, and more women would now view this type of
nonconsensual sex as rape.
Public discourse on acquaintance rape in the last few years
tends to confirm this change in attitude. Much has been written
about rape in dating situations, and the clear message has been that
rape occurs whenever a woman is forced to have sex against her will,
whether by a date, a husband, or a stranger.15 The empirical data
and the public discourse thus suggest it is more likely that women
today would consider nonconsensual sex with acquaintances as
rape, regardless of any voluntary participation in activities short of
intercourse.
If this conclusion is sound, some of the increase in the UCR
rate may be a function of women's changing perception of what
constitutes rape.56 It is, after all, the woman's viewpoint that is
critical because it is the victim, almost always a woman, who defines
54. Id. at 230 (finding "no sex difference on victim blame").
55. See, e.g., Laurie Bechhofer & Andrea Parrot, What is Acquaintance Rape?, in
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME, supra note 1, at 16-17 ("When the law is
interpreted in its broadest form, rape occurs any time a person is forced to have sex...
against his or her will and without his or her consent."); see generally Douglas N. Husak &
George C. Thomas III, Rape, Social Convention, and Reasonable Mistake, 11 LAw & PHIL. 95,
114-25 (1992) (discussing some of the scholarly literature on acquaintance rape).
56. A changing definition of "non-stranger" rape is, at most, a partial explanation of
the UCR rate increase. To see the maximum effect of a changing definition, assume that
the NCS ratio of "stranger" to "non-stranger" rape accurately reflects, in a given year,
the prevailing cultural definition of "non-stranger" rape. Assume also that the
definition of "stranger" rape has not changed in the last 20 years so that any change in
the ratio reflects a change in the definition of "non-stranger" rape only. Assume further
that the UCR rate is a composite of "stranger" and "non-stranger" rape in the same
ratio in any given year as the NCS rate. In other words, in 1973, when the NCS ratio was
2.3:1, the UCR rate of .24 consisted of .17 "stranger" rapes and .7 "non-stranger"
rapes. The question is what would the 1973 UCR rate have been if the 1990 NCS ratio
of .75:1 had been applied? Again, the assumption here is that the 1973 UCR rate would
have been higher if it reflected as many "non-stranger" rapes as would have been
reflected under the 1990 definition.
The 1973 UCR rate would have been .40 rather than .24 if the 1990 NCS ratio had
applied (the assumed 1973 UCR "stranger" rape rate of .17 divided by the 1990 NCS
ratio of .75, with the resulting assumed "non-stranger" rate of .23 added to the assumed
"stranger" rape rate of .17, for a total assumed 1973 UCR rate of .40). This calculation
suggests that the rape rate has not increased since 1973, and that fully .17 (.40-.23) of
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the act as rape, either to the police or to the NCS. And the
divergence in NCS rates for "stranger" and "non-stranger" rapes is
consistent with the hypothesis that more "non-stranger" sex acts are
being reported as rape today than in earlier years.
To be sure, the divergence in NCS rape rates could be a real
divergence, uninfluenced by social construction of the "non-
stranger" category. This account is not fully satisfying, however,
because it does not explain why NCS rates have gone down and
UCR rates have gone up over the last two decades. On the other
hand, a real divergence between "stranger" and "non-stranger"
rape rates has a certain plausibility in light of the "rape awareness"
movement. While the same causal forces may underlie both
categories of rape,57 the "rape awareness" movement has sought
changes in the environment (better lights, more police, etc.) and in
the behavior of women that would make "stranger" rape harder to
commit.5" A "non-stranger" rapist, on the other hand, has the same
the .41 rate in 1990 consisted of "non-stranger" rapes that were occurring but did not
appear in the 1973 data.
I must confess, however, some misgivings about the previous calculation. The 1990
NCS ratio looks atypical, as does the 1989 ratio, perhaps the result of two roundings that
were close to .05. A more conservative approach would suggest obtaining an average
ratio from three years (1988, 1989, and 1990) to even out what appear to be rounding
effects. That ratio is 1.11:1. Using the average ratio on the 1973 UCR figures produces
an adjusted rate of .32 or an additional .08 of unrecognized "non-stranger" rapes.
Either adjustment substantially reduces a 70% UCR increase in the period 1973-
1990, to almost zero in one case and to only a 28% increase in the other. Both adjusted
UCR trends are, however, still different from the NCS total rate trend, down by roughly
33%. Thus, the adjustment is a significant, though partial, potential explanation for the
difference in trends.
57. Indeed, it is misleading even to speak of two "categories" of rape. There is only
one crime of rape-having forcible sexual intercourse against the will of the victim. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 1 (noting that the central notion of rape has always
been "unlawful sexual intercourse committed upon a female by imposition").
58. See NANCY GAGER & CATHLEEN SCHURR, CONFRONTING RAPE IN AMERICA 259-78
(1976) (discussing the rape prevention work of several rape crisis centers which began
springing up in the early 1970s); NAT'L CENTER FOR THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF
RAPE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, EXEMP.ARY RAPE CRISIS PROGRAMS:
A CROSS-SITE ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDIES 6-8 (1985) (describing the rape prevention
programs of rape crisis centers in the 1970s). ..
The "rape awareness" movement has also encouraged victims to report rapes. This
aspect of "rape awareness" is more relevant to the UCR rates, which depend on the
willingness of the victim to come forward; and thus, greater rape awareness is another
factor suggesting that part of the increase in UCR rates may be an increased reporting
rate. But encouraging women to report rapes seems likely to enhance the value they
place on their physical autonomy, see infra note 117 and accompanying text, which might
also cause more NCS respondents to categorize a sex encounter as rape. Because the
categorization issue is more difficult with respect to "non-stranger" rapes, any effect
from "rape awareness" is probably substantially greater in that category.
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access to his victim today as he did two decades ago.
Rape awareness is almost certainly part of the explanation for
the divergence in NCS "stranger" and "non-stranger" rates, but it is
doubtful that heightened awareness would cause a divergence of the
magnitude seen in Table 1. While "non-stranger" rates held
constant, 59 the average "stranger" rate fell from .64 in the period
1973-1981 to .40 in the period 1982-1990; a decline of thirty-seven
percent. Yet it is difficult to believe that rape awareness has had this
great an impact, especially in light of the fact that the "stranger"
rape rates began to decline substantially only in the 1980s when the
rape awareness movement was already ten to fifteen years old.6 °
It seems likely, therefore, that the divergence in NCS
"stranger" and "non-stranger" rates is attributable in substantial
part to a broadening definition of "non-stranger" rape.6 ' Under
this reading of the NCS data, overtly forcible intercourse began to
decline around 1980, while the societal definition of rape
simultaneously broadened, focusing less on overt force and more on
other coercive practices that vitiate the woman's consent. These
potentially related developments suggest that the NCS "stranger"
rape rates are a more accurate representation of the true trend in
rape rates over time than any other measure we have.62
The NCS "stranger" rates, which declined dramatically from
1973 to 1986, clearly refute the anti-pornography premise that rape
rates have increased dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s. Even
the UCR data show a significant slowing in the rate of increase.
From 1980 to 1990, the UCR rate increased only fourteen percent
compared to an increase of fifty percent from 1973 to 1980.63 If the
pornography explosion continued through the 1980s, the slowing
growth of the UCR figures would also tend to undermine the anti-
pornography syllogism's link between pornography and rape.
59. The average "non-stranger" rate was .32 for the 1973-1981 period and .31 for
the 1982-1990 period.
60. See supra note 58.
61. See Ber Kutchinsky, Pornography and Its Effects in Denmark and the United States: A
Reoinder and Beyond, in 8 COMPARATIVE SOCIAL RESEARCH 301 (R. Tomasson, ed. 1985).
62. To be clear, I do not claim that sex accomplished by means of overt force is
somehow a more "true" form of rape. All I claim is that useful comparisons cannot be
made over time if the offense definition is simultaneously changing. Thus, the only way
to compare rape rates over time is to use a rape definition that has changed as little as
possible and make the brute assumption that all other forms of rape have roughly the
same trend. This methodology suggests using NCS "stranger" rape rates. It is unlikely
that we are now socially constructing the concept of "stranger" rape differently from the
way we did twenty years ago because overt force is typically used in this category.
63. See supra Table 1.
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Having tested the premise that rape rates have increased
dramatically, I now wish to test the "proof" of the anti-pornography
syllogism: that pornography consumption increased substantially in
the last twenty years. Many would probably take that proposition on
faith. But as just demonstrated, another tenet that many take on
faith-rapidly increasing rape rates-may not be true. Moreover,
one of the most telling criticisms of temporal studies of the
relationship between rape and pornography is the lack of
quantification of pornography consumption.6 I will, therefore,
attempt an estimate of pornography consumption.
II. PORNOGRAPHY CONSUMPTION
A difficult threshold question is what constitutes pornography.
A rough, but useful, definition is "sexually related material, with
some degree of explicitness."65 It may be impossible to reach
agreement about which socially constructed images are porno-
graphic even under this broad definition; it is certainly impossible to
measure the more subtle ways these images are created. For in-
stance, advertisements have used sexual images more frequently in
the last few years to sell a broad spectrum of products. Whether or
not these images are pornographic, their incidence is virtually im-
possible to measure. At the other end of the spectrum, the sub-
universe of violent pornography, while undeniably pornographic,
also cannot be measured because no data exist. It seems likely,
however, that certain overt, measurable forms of sexually explicit
material can serve as a proxy for the nonmeasurable forms. Based
on this assumption, an index of pornography consumption can be
created from annual dollar sales of three types of measurable por-
nography: "soft-core" sex magazine circulation, adult video sales,
64. See Steven A. Childress, Pornography, "Serious Rape, " and Statistics: A Reply to Dr.
Kutchinsky, 26 LAW & Soc'y REV. 457, 458 (1992).
65. See Steven A. Childress, Reel "Rape Speech ": Violent Pornography and the Politics of
Harm, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 177, 179 (1991). Cass Sunstein uses "pornographic" much
more narrowly to mean material that "both sexualizes violence and defines women as
sexually subordinate to men." See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 592. While a writer can
define a word to mean anything he or she wishes, Sunstein's argument that the underly-
ing harm-based rationale for regulating pornography can be derived from its historical
definition, see id. at 595, seems odd. "Pornography" derives from the Greekporne, which
means "prostitute." Thus, it literally means a description of the activities of prostitutes.
See KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY 174 (1979). I do not believe prostitution
inevitably entails the kinds of specific harm to women that Sunstein details. See Sunstein,
supra note 16, at 595-602. See generally GORDON HAWKINS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, POR-




and revenues from "phone sex" (telephone calls in which the caller
hears or relates sexual fantasies).
Another assumption underlies the index. The level of pornog-
raphy consumption is important only to the extent that it has an
effect on rape rates. Thus, the dollar-denominated index used here
would be significant only if an increased number of dollars spent on
pornography buys a corresponding increase in pornographic effect.
If the effect is not related to the total dollars spent, then any dollar-
denominated index misses the point.6 6
But it seems plausible to treat a dollar's worth of pornography
(adjusted for inflation) as equivalent in effect with any other dollar's
worth of pornography. If, for example, a single adult videotape
costs four times more than an adult magazine, the purchaser of the
videotape presumably receives at least four times the pornographic
effect of a magazine. And who would be a better judge of the por-
nographic effect than the consumer? If this premise is correct, it is
reasonable to treat the videotape as "worth" four magazines.
While this "dollar-equivalence" principle may be somewhat harder
to defend in the phone sex context,6 7 it underlies all three compo-
nents of the index. Thus, Table 2 contains a consumption index
that combines the dollars spent on three categories of pornography:
soft-core pornographic magazines (represented by ten of the most
popular in the category),68  phone sex calls,6 9  and adult
66. The three types of pornography consumption are later broken down by units
sold. See infra Table 3.
67. The argument is that the purchaser of a magazine or a videotape becomes the
owner of a tangible object that can be reused indefinitely and, indeed, shared with
others. The phone sex call, on the other hand, does not automatically create tangible
evidence of itself. Thus, a forty-dollar phone call may have less "effect" than a video-
tape or four magazines. There is, however, no available method to "discount" the
phone sex revenues to achieve an "effect parity" with magazines and videotapes. More-
over, the specific mechanism by which pornography might cause rape is unknown.
Thus, positing a difference in the effect of a phone call versus a videotape is speculative.
On the other hand, we can be certain that the repeat phone sex customer has made the
judgment that his call will provide him with at least as much temporary pornographic
effect as an equivalent dollar value of magazines or videotapes.
68. Because magazine sales for many soft-core and all hard-core magazines are un-
available, I used only the following ten magazines, not all of which were published (or
made their circulation public) in all of the years studied: Playboy, Penthouse, Oui, Forum,
Hustler, Gallery, Cheri, Club, High Society, and Genesis. When a magazine ceased supplying
circulation figures to the Audit Bureau of Circulations, I assumed a decline of 10% per
year for the next five years, after which I dropped the magazine from the index. Dollar
volumes were obtained by multiplying the total annual circulation by an estimated cost
per issue.
69. Data about revenues from "900" numbers were considered first. See Richard D.
Hylton, All About Pay-Per-Call Lines: For 900 Numbers, the Racy Gives Way to the Respectable,
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Estimates in Millions of Constant 1982-1984 Dollars
(Sales of Magazines, Videos, and Phone Sex)
Year Dollars Year Dollars
1970 16 1981 45
1971 19 1982 38
1972 28 1983 340
1973 34 1984 430
1974 30 1985 565
1975 35 1986 690
1976 38 1987 625
1977 47 1988 595
1978 44 1989 635
1979 42 1990 710
1980 43
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1992, § 3, at 8. This data may be flawed in three ways. First, reve-
nues from 900 numbers "are estimates based on incomplete data and some in the indus-
try believe they are somewhat inflated." Id. Second, although the revenue data are
broken down into the categories of "Entertainment," "Information," "Ordering," and
"Other," the information does not segregate phone sex calls. While I believe that most
of the calls in "Entertainment" are for phone sex, the remainder being primarily calls to
sports and entertainment idols, I indulged a conservative assumption that only half of
the "Entertainment" calls are phone sex calls. Third, 900 numbers represent only a part
of the phone sex business; the other revenue sources are phone numbers-often 800
numbers-that require a credit card. The ratio of ads for these "other number" phone
sex services to 900-number phone sex ads in Penthouse from 1985 through 1991 was 3.5
to 1. Again, to be conservative, I tripled the total revenue figure from the above 900-
number calculation and added that to the 900-number revenues. The assumption here,
of course, is that advertising space is, over time, roughly commensurate with revenues
derived from the advertising.
70. See Charting the Adult Industry, 1990 ADULT VIDEO NEWS BUYER's GuIDE,Jan. 1990,
at 6, 6-7 (reporting data based on a survey of 500 stores) (used with permission of Paul
Fishbein, publisher of Adult Video News). While Adult Video News promotes the adult video
industry, and has an interest in demonstrating the success of the industry, the figures
show a sales peak in 1986, a decline in 1987, and then a stabilization in 1988 and 1989.
These developments suggest unbiased data.
Because the other data in the consumption index was reported at retail value, the
adult tape sales data, which represent wholesale costs, were adjusted to retail value by
assuming a gross profit margin of 34%. See 1985 Retailer Survey, VIDEO STORE, Aug.
1985, at 72 (noting an average "gross margin percentage of 34% for videos retailing in
1985"). Again, this is a conservative estimate, as the mark-up for adult tapes is likely to
exceed the mark-up in the industry generally. Telephone Interview with Paul Fishbein,
Publisher of Adult Video News (Dec. 8, 1992).
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Table 2 has limitations, particularly in comparisons between the
1970-1982 period and the 1983-1990 period. It is hardly plausible
that consumption went up by a factor of nine between 1982 and
1983. The steep increase in 1983 is attributable to the fact that data
on the sale of adult videotapes first became available in that year.
Comparisons within these periods, however, do seem plausible.
Table 2 discloses that the consumption of pornography more than
doubled between 1970 and 1980. A partial confirmation of this
estimate of pornography consumption is Joseph Scott's longitudinal
content analysis of sex references in mass circulation magazines. 7'
Scott found that the number of sex references in nonpornographic
magazines roughly doubled between 1970 and 1980.72 Between
1983 and 1990, according to Table 2, consumption doubled again.
Thus, a conservative estimate is that the consumption of
pornography quadrupled between 1970 and 1990. Given the
greater availability of Playboy and Penthouse through the 1970s, the
advent of affordable VCRs in the early 1980s, and the proliferation
of phone sex services in the late 1980s, the Table 2 estimates seem
plausible.73
For those troubled by the use of a dollar-denominated index to
represent the level of pornography consumption,74 the data can be
displayed for each of the three components by sales units. While
magazine data are reported by magazines sold, the other data
require assumptions to obtain comparable per unit sales figures.7 5
Table 3 contains these data sets. (Recall that the magazine data
include only a subset of all sex magazines.)
71. See Joseph E. Scott, Updated Longitudinal Content Analysis of Sex References in Mass
Circulation Magazines, 22J. SEX REs. 385 (1986). 1
72. See id. at 387-88. Using Reader's Digest, McCall's, Life, Saturday Evening Post, Time,
and Newsweek as a database, the study found an increase from .42 to .88 references per
page during the period 1970-1980. Id. at 387.
73. Table 2 is also generally consistent with the 1986 Attorney General's
Commission on Pornography; its report stated that "more than in 1970, when the
President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography issued its report, and indeed
more than just a year ago in 1985, we live in a society unquestionably pervaded by
sexual explicitness." MEESE COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 277.
74. See supra note 66.
75. The adult video data are total wholesale sales. To convert to retail, I added
34%. To determine the number of units, I divided by the average cost of a video in the
years in question. See supra note 70. To compute the number of minutes of phone sex, I









































































One message emerges clearly from Table 3: the national
appetite for pornography is fickle as to the desired form. Sales of
pornographic magazines have been on the decline since 1980 and,
at least in the index, are at the same level in 1990 as they were in
1970. This decline was accompanied by an increase in the newer
medium of videotape. In 1986, however, videotape sales reached a
plateau, with the dramatic escalation now in phone sex.76 The next
phase in consumption may be through networked computers and
then interactive computers that permit users to experience their
76. To check the dramatic increase in phone sex revenues shown in Table 3, I
counted the phone sex advertising in a random sample of Penthouse issues for each year
from 1984 to 1991. The figures below represent the average number of pages devoted
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fantasies.77 This changing appetite makes it more difficult to gauge
whether overall consumption is on the increase.
Table 3 raises yet another complexity. If phone sex is
generically distinct from other forms of pornography consumption
in terms of its effect on rape rates, 78 and is, therefore, excluded
from Table 3, the result is a leveling-off of pornography
consumption in the late 1980s. If, on the other hand, phone sex is
properly considered as a component of the dollar-denominated
index, the evidence suggests a continued rapid increase in the
consumption of pornography that would affect rape rates if the anti-
pornography syllogism is correct. Indeed, Table 3 discloses that
roughly 130,000,000 pornographic videotapes were sold between
1983 and 1990, and almost 200,000,000 minutes of phone sex were
sold in 1990 alone. This is more than one adult video and about
two minutes of phone sex for each adult male in the United States.
Moreover, the Table 3 index does not include video rentals or
subscriptions to cable channels that show soft-core adult videos. All
of this evidence suggests a substantial increase in pornography
consumption over the last two decades.
The evidence presented thus far puts the proponents of the
anti-pornography syllogism in a somewhat awkward position.
Central to their syllogism is the twin claim that rape rates and










The overall trend in advertising confirms the figures in Table 3 and even the change in
magnitude is roughly consistent. For example, in both sets of figures, the 1990 number
is about 2.5 times the 1987 number.
77. See John Markoff, The Latest Technology Fuels the Oldest of Drives, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
22, 1992, § 4, at 5 (reporting the growth of sexually explicit computer bulletin boards
and interactive video games).
78. Phone sex may be distinct from other forms of pornography in that it is not
purchased as a tangible product. Consequently, the pornographic effect of phone sex
may dissipate. See supra note 67. A difference may also be attributable to some quality
about phone sex itself. For example, many phone sex numbers advertise live
conversation. Perhaps this contact with a human being comes closer to replicating an
actual sex act. Thus, phone sex may be more of an end in itself than other stimulation
that could cause a prospective rapist to seek additional gratification.
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1980s. The data show, however, that only one-half of that claim is
likely true: pornography consumption did experience tremendous
growth during the last twenty years. But the most reliable evidence,
that of the NCS, indicates that rape rates have actually declined over
time. Even the UCR data fail to show the type of dramatic increase
in rape rates which would be consistent with the explosion in
pornography consumption that occurred in the 1980s. If the
pornography consumption increase is not even roughly matched by
a corresponding increase in rape rates, where is the causal
connection advanced by the syllogism? That question is the subject
of the next section.
III. THE PORNOGRAPHY-RAPE CAUSAL QUESTION
Causation is an exceedingly difficult concept. It indulges a
threshold assumption that because Y follows X in time-say, the
vase fell to the floor and broke after my hand touched the vase-it is
possible for X to cause Y. Perhaps causation does not exist, or
maybe, as Kant argued, causation is simply the way the human brain
orders information.79
Whatever causation means, there are grave difficulties inherent
in proving that X causes Y in a complex, multi-causal world. Imag-
ine trying to prove that pornography causes rape. One could, at
first, imagine a causal link that operated overtly and quickly. This
would assume the existence of a group of rape-prone men, who,
upon consuming the "right" pornography, quickly seek a victim. In
this case, one could say with some confidence that consuming the
pornography caused the rape.
At the other end of the imagined causal spectrum is a less self-
evident relationship that works slowly and subtly. Imagine, for ex-
ample, that pornography causes men to have lower esteem for
women, to value their autonomy less and to think that their sole
function is to excite and satisfy male lust. This type of causal effect
might take years or even decades to manifest itself in rape rates and
might show up only in studies of large groups of men. Indeed,
under this view, pornography might cause men to become rape-
prone without being the immediate precipitating cause of the act of
rape.
79. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 50-51, 138-40 (Norman K. Smith
trans., unabridged ed. 1965) (1787) (concluding that "the concept of a cause is nothing
but a synthesis (of that which follows in the time-series, with other appearances) according
to concepts," all of which constitute a "unity, which has its a priori rule, and which subjects
the appearances to itself").
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The first type of causal connection-the immediate effect on in-
dividual men-presumably could be measured by laboratory stud-
ies, and will be discussed in subpart B. The second, less self-
evident, type of causal relationship presumably would show up over
time as a relationship between rape and pornography consumption,
most easily measured as national phenomena. 0 I will turn first to
whether the long-term trends suggest a causal link.
A. National Trends Over Time
To facilitate a comparison of the trends in rape rates with the
estimated consumption of pornography, Figure 1 contains most of
the information from Tables 1 and 2 rearranged into graph form.8 '
Figure 1 is presented in two parts, with 1970-1982 (Figure IA) sepa-
rate from 1983-1990 (Figure 1B), because the consumption figures
are different in those periods by an order of magnitude and because
different units make the graphs easier to read. 2
While the UCR rates move somewhat in tandem with pornogra-
phy consumption in Figure IA, that relationship does not hold in
Figure I B, where consumption soared while UCR rates were almost
flat. The NCS rates move, for the most part, in the opposite direc-
tion from pornography consumption in both Figures. If the esti-
mates of consumption in Table 2 are more or less accurate, only
three explanations of the results in Figure 1 are plausible. First, the
effect of pornography consumption on rape rates may not be mea-
surable, either because it is de minimis or because it is masked by
other causal forces. Second, pornography may have no positive
causal effect on rape rates. Third, the effect may lag behind the con-
sumption by several years.
80. See, e.g., Berl Kutchinsky, Towards an Explanation of the Decrease in Registered Sex
Crimes in Copenhagen, in 7 TECHNICAL REPORTS OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND
PORNOGRAPHY 263 (1971) (examining the decrease in sex crimes in Copenhagen from
1959-1969). Kutchinsky has described his own studies as demonstrating that in the four
countries he studied, West Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and the United States, "rape
never increased more than nonsexual violent crime, and there was an overall tendency
toward stagnating or even decreasing rape rates in precisely those years when pornogra-
phy became more pervasive than ever through videos and cable or coded television."
Berl Kutchinsky, The Politics of Pornography Research, 26 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 447, 451
(1992).
81. Because the NCS "stranger" rape rates are likely to be more accurate than the
NCS "non-stranger" rates, however, only the former are included.
82. The consumption index from 1970-1982 is divided by 100 and the index from
1983-1990 is divided by 1000.
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FIGURE 1A
Pornography Consumption and Rape Rates
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FIGURE 1B
Pornography Consumption and Rape Rates
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The first two explanations deny the possibility of finding evi-
dence of a causal link, and are therefore irrelevant for the purposes
of this Article. This leaves only the third explanation: that an
increased consumption of pornography causes a change in attitude
toward women that increases the likelihood of rape, but requires a
relatively long period of time to manifest itself.83 This "lag" expla-
nation is somewhat consistent with the UCR data. The sharp in-
crease in pornography consumption from 1970 to 1973 parallels the
increase in the UCR rates from 1976 to 1980. Similarly, the slowing
rise in consumption in the period 1973 to 1981 was followed by a
flattening of the trend in the UCR rates in the period 1980 to 1989.
Another virtue of the "lag theory" is that it can be tested
against the rape rates in the early 1990s. Assuming, again, that the
consumption estimates in Table 2 are roughly accurate, the "lag
theory" necessarily predicts that we will soon see a period of in-
creasing rape rates, produced as an echo of the large increase in
pornography consumption in the mid- to late 1980s.
The echo may be beginning. As Table 1 discloses, the UCR
rates increased substantially in 1990, and preliminary NCS figures
show a large increase in 1991.4 However, these preliminary NCS
figures are not yet reported by category; thus, it is unclear whether
the increase is attributable to a rise in the most reliable indicator of
trends in the rape rate-NCS "stranger" rates.85 Moreover, one
year does not a trend make. Perhaps the data for the next few years
will provide some clues as to whether the "lag theory" is plausible.86
83. A "lag" theory would, I think, be consistent with the MacKinnon-Dworkin theory
that pornography is part of the male construction of female sexuality and gender. Any
changes in that construct caused by increased consumption of pornography would likely
be evolutionary, taking years to crystallize into a view of women as more "deserving" of
being raped.
84. See Johnston, supra note 27, at A14 (noting a preliminary estimated increase in
total rapes of almost 60%). But see Lisa D. Bastian, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Criminal Vic-
timization 1991, at 3 tlb. 2 (Oct. 1992) (showing a smaller estimated increase, within the
range of statistical error, in the final NCS report).
85. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
86. While there is nothing conceptually implausible about "lag" theories, they are
usually an argument of last resort. Lacking evidence of a more immediate relationship, a
theorist can always postulate a "lag" between cause and effect. As data over time tend
to include "sawtooth" moves (the stock market is a good example), almost any data set
can be made consistent with a particular theory if a sufficiently elastic "lag" is postu-
lated. By introducing this additional imprecision, "lag" theories make virtually impossi-
ble the already treacherous task of isolating a plausible cause-and-effect relationship. If,
for example, the effect of pornography on rape rates is theorized to lag by several years,
any effect "demonstrated" by the data could just as easily be the effect of changes in
other variables (demographics, poverty, urbanization, etc.). The potential causal effect
of other variables is discussed infra Part III.C.
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Figure 1B also suggests a contrary, more controversial, hypoth-
esis. One can accept that pornography promotes an unacceptable
image of women as passive sex objects without accepting the further
premise that its consumption is positively correlated with rape. It is
possible that pornography simultaneously strengthens a certain im-
age of women and provides an outlet for men who are drawn to that
image.8 7 If so, it is not inconceivable that pornography actually
reduces the incidence of rape. Stabilization or further declines in
the rape rates during the 1990s would support this hypothesis.
The analysis to this point depends on the Table 2 index being
an accurate measure of pornography consumption and, to a lesser
extent, on a belief that the NCS "stranger" rape rates are the best
FIGURE 2
Adjusted Pornography Consumption and UCR Rape Rates
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87. See THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 179 (Ran-
dom House 1970) (from materials released by the Commission on Sept. 30, 1970) (not-
ing suggestions that pornography "perform[s] a useful function for individuals by
extending opportunities for sexual expression[,] . . . serves a cathartic function, i.e., it
serves as a sexual release .... [and] may have instructional value and may discourage
sexual inadequacy").
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measure of the actual incidence of rape. To examine one contrary
set of premises, a dollar-denominated index that excludes phone
sex88 is compared in Figure 2 with the UCR rates. As phone sex is
part of the consumption index only in the 1983-1990 period, Figure
2 is limited to that period. There is not much correlation in Figure
2. While the lines moved in the same direction in the 1983-1986
period, the magnitude of the increase in consumption dwarfed the
very slow increase in UCR rates. Since 1986, the lines have actually
been moving in opposite directions. And, as Figure 3 shows, the
NCS "stranger" rates do not match the adjusted consumption index
(which excludes phone sex) very well either. The NCS rates went
down while consumption went up, and then stabilized in a range
between .3 and .4 as consumption fell. Nor would Table 3 look very
FIGURE 3
Adjusted Pornography Consumption and NCS
"Stranger" Rape Rates
Trends over Time (1982-1990)
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different if "non-stranger" rates were used, as they have been
locked in a narrow range between .3 and .4 for the entire period
(with a single dip in 1989 to .2). But, ultimately, a consumption
index without phone sex misses the point. The pornography
consumer is presumably the best measure of what causes maximum
effect per dollar spent, and it is not for researchers to second-guess
that choice. Thus, Figures IA and lB seem a more plausible
description of the long-term relationship between consumption and
rape rates.
Having considered the available national data over time, I will
turn to the other end of the spectrum. Does pornography cause
individual men to become more rape-prone?
B. Laboratory Studies
Laboratory simulation studies use volunteers to test the experi-
mental relationship between certain stimuli and an attitude that is
hypothetically associated with rape. For example, a group of male
volunteers might be given an attitude survey and then divided into
three groups, each having the same average rating for hostility to-
ward women and for tolerance of rape. Each group would then be
shown a different kind of movie, only one of which is pornographic.
If the group shown pornography tested higher in hostility toward
women and higher in tolerance of rape, the researcher has evidence
of a causal link between certain stimuli and certain attitudes toward
women and rape.8 9 A different type of laboratory simulation in-
volves showing various types of stimuli to groups of rapists and then
measuring their sexual arousal. 90
The inherent difficulty with laboratory simulations is that they
cannot, and are not designed to, achieve a direct measurement of a
causal link between pornography and rape. For obvious reasons,
ethical principles forbid designing a study in which some subjects
might commit rape. Instead, laboratory simulations seek to mea-
sure the conduct or attitudes thought to be linked with rape. But
89. See, e.g.,James V. Check & Ted H. Guloien, Reported Proclivity for Coercive Sex Fol-
lowing Repeated Exposure to Sexually Violent Pornography, Nonviolent Dehumanizing Pornography,
and Erotica, in PORNOGRAPHY: RESEARCH ADVANCES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 159,
170-71 (Dolf Zillmann &Jennings Bryant eds., 1989) (conducting a study similar to the
one described in the text and finding that subjects who had been exposed to violent
pornography reported a greater likelihood of raping than those not exposed).
90. See, e.g., W.L. Marshall, Pornography and Sex Offenders, in PORNOGRAPHY: RESEARCH
ADVANCES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 89, at 185, 191-93 (reviewing the




that link remains conjectural. 9 '
Some of the conjecture seems questionable. While increased
hostility toward women or increased tolerance of rape may seem in-
tuitively to be linked with rape, one could imagine a psychological
model of rape in which neither factor plays a major role.9" More-
over, no one knows whether any measured effect from exposure to
pornography in the laboratory plays a causal role in rape. We do
not know, for example, "whether the effects of repeated exposures
to violent pornography are temporary or cumulative. ' '93 Nor can we
isolate the causal effect of any non-temporary change in attitude.
After all, "the vast majority of males do not become rapists after
being exposed to pornography .... It seems likely that other fac-
tors, such as an existing deeply rooted anger against women, are
more important in causing violent aggression.' 94 Indeed, studies of
convicted rapists have consistently shown that, in comparison to
control groups, their exposure to pornography occurred less fre-
quently and later in life.95
Thus, the principal difficulty with laboratory simulations is that
they can never establish whether attitudinal or physiological
changes measured shortly after exposure to pornography in the lab-
oratory setting are a causal factor in rape. Because much of the
weight of the criminal and moral law is placed on behavior rather
than attitudes or thoughts,9 6 this lack of evidence renders the labo-
ratory simulations problematic as indications of a causal link be-
tween pornography and rape. However, evidence of a causal link
can be obtained from state-by-state correlation studies that use ac-
tual rape rates.
91. Cf. Childress, supra note 65, at 184 (noting that "the larger problem of drawing
real-world inferences from the [laboratory] data is inadequately resolved").
92. For example, rapists may love women and hate themselves; if so, rape could be a
way of having the loved object reject them and confirm their self-hatred.
93. See DOWNS, supra note 5, at 168.
94. Id. at 169.
95. See Childress, supra note 65, at 182 n.4 (noting that "[t]his consistent finding is
especially telling since such studies may be the closest model to an epidemiological
study that we have").
96. First-year law students quickly learn the black-letter rule of criminal law that no
crime has occurred in the absence of an actus reus (forbidden act). While this rule is an
oversimplification, see generally DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 78-111
(1987) (examining the physical component of crime), it at least expresses the widely




Correlation studies seek to uncover statistical relationships
between hypothetically relevant factors and the variable being
studied-rape rates, in this Article. By comparing data from each of
the fifty states, which exhibit the hypothetically relevant factors in
varying degrees, a correlation study can determine which of these
factors are significantly related to the variation in rape rates among
the states. An advantage to these studies is that, through the use of
reported rape rates, they are able to measure reported behavior
rather than attitudes. One disadvantage, however, is that the only
rape rates available on a state-by-state basis are the UCR rates,
which are subject to reporting distortions if women in different
states report rapes to the police with varying frequency. A further
statistical difficulty inherent in correlation studies is determining
whether a significant correlation is merely coincidental-or "spuri-
ous" in the language of statisticians. To illustrate, if a significant
correlation exists between rape rates and the number of green cars
registered in a state, there is every reason to suspect that such a
correlation is spurious.
Strong statistical correlations, however, will imply causation
when viewed in conjunction with our intuition about what factors
seem to cause a certain result. There is, for example, an extremely
strong correlation between circulation of pornographic magazines
and the percentage of a state's population that is male.97 Although
this does not prove that being male is a factor tending to cause one
to purchase a pornographic magazine, most would be willing to
make that leap from correlational findings to causation. Thus, while
correlational research can suggest causation, the results must be in-
terpreted within the construct of our pre-existing notions about
what causation means.9"
To clarify the relationships among variables, statisticians use a
technique of mathematical modeling known as multiple regression
analysis. Multiple regression analysis seeks to isolate the effect that
each independent variable has on the dependent variable being
97. Performing a correlation analysis using 1980 data produces a correlation of .76,
p < .001, which means that the probability of random chance causing the correlation is
less than 1 in 1000. Baron and Straus ran a correlation analysis between sex magazine
circulation and the percentage of male population, aged 15-24, which produced a lower
correlation (.58) but one that was still significant at p < .001. See LARRY BARON & MUR-
RAY A. STRAUS, FOUR THEORIES OF RAPE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 199 (1989).
98. It is difficult to talk about causation without echoing Kant. See KANT, supra note
79, at 569 ("Thus all human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to
concepts, and ends with ideas.").
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studied. While variables can be highly correlated when compared
only to each other, they may not be significantly linked in a multiple
regression equation because other variables in the equation may
better explain the behavior of the dependent variable.
Consider a strongly significant correlation between variables A
and B where our intuition tells us that A causes B. We do not, by
statistics or intuition, rule out the possibility that the link in question
is part of a more complex relationship. Perhaps C is linked with
both A and B. Indeed, C might provide a better explanation of the
variation in B than A does. If so, and C is not included in the multi-
ple regression equation, the link between A and B may appear sig-
nificant.99 Once C is introduced into the equation, however,
multiple regression will tell us that C, and not A, better explains the
variation in B.
For example, in a 1984 study conducted by Larry Baron and
Murray Straus, the correlation between the distribution of porno-
graphic magazines and rape rates was found to be very signifi-
cant.' 00 But the magazine variable might have been "standing in"
for some other variable that better explains the variation in rape
rates. Perhaps the most significant correlation is between rape rates
and the ratio of males to females.' 0 ' As noted earlier, this "gender"
variable has a high positive correlation with pornographic magazine
circulation. 102 Thus, if gender is not introduced into the multiple
regression equation, the correlation between rape rates and porno-
graphic magazine circulation might be simply reflecting a correla-
tion between rape rates and gender. Indeed, this scenario is
consistent with the data from Alaska, which consistently has one of
99. This "missing link" principle is still urged, for instance, by the tobacco industry
scientists who argue that a true causal link between smoking and lung cancer has yet to
be proven. See, e.g., Irwin Stark, The Tobacco Industry's Last Gasp, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1988, at A35 (noting the tobacco companies' insistence that there is no "direct evi-
dence" that smoking cigarettes causes lung cancer). They argue that, despite the statis-
tical link, it may be that the group of smokers is more likely to engage in some other
activity that is the actual cause. See, e.g., Jamie Talen, Focus on Smoking: Good News and
Bad, NEWSDAY, June 24, 1989, at 7 ("All of [the] studies make a statistical correlation,
not a causal one .... (quoting Brennan Dawson, assistant to the president of the To-
bacco Institute)). If this is so, the link between smoking and lung cancer would become
insignificant when a variable for the other activity is introduced into the regression
equation.
100. See Baron & Straus, supra note 1, at 197 (giving correlation of .630 andp < .001,
which means a probability of less than 1 in 1000 that the correlation is attributable to
random chance).
101. See BARON & STRAus, supra note 97, at 55.
102. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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the highest rape rates 103 and one of the highest circulations of por-
nographic magazines. 10
4
In their study, Baron and Straus attempted to unmask any
"stand in" or proxy relationship between pornography distribution
and rape by introducing variables into the multiple regression equa-
tion that might be linked to both rape rates and pornographic maga-
zine circulation. °5 They also introduced variables that tested the
association between rape rates and other violent crimes as well as
between rape rates and a measure of the status of women.' 0 6 The
possible relationship between rape rates and other violent crimes is
obvious: rape is a form of violence against women; a state in which
people are more prone to resort to other forms of violence is there-
fore likely to have a high rape rate as well. The relationship be-
tween the status of women and rape is less obvious. Some have
speculated that a culture in which women are held in low regard is
likely to have a high rape rate.10 7
Table 4 summarizes the Baron and Straus results by identifying
the independent variables tested, the significance of the marginal
correlation of each independent variable with the rape rate (the p
value), and whether this correlation is positive or negative. In social
science research, a correlation is considered statistically significant
when thep value is less than .05, which means that there is less than
a five percent chance that the correlation is coincidental or spuri-
ous. ' A positive marginal correlation means that the independent
variable is linked, in this equation,109 with higher rape rates, and a
103. See BARON & STRAUS, supra note 97, at 42 tbl. 3.1 (ranked first in 1960, fourth in
1970, and second in 1980).
104. See id. at 121 tbl. 5.6 (ranked first in 1979 with 59.0 per 100 males age 15 and
older). But Alaska also has one of the two largest percentages of males nationally. See
id. at 50 tbl. 3.5b (54.3%).
105. See Baron & Straus, supra note 1, at 199-200. The additional variables are given
as numbers 6-10 in Table 4, infra. See also id. at 200 tbl. 7.5.
106. See id. at 199-200 & tbl. 7.5; infra Table 4 (variables 2-5).
107. See Baron & Straus, supra note 1, at 194-95 (suggesting the possibility of an in-
verse relationship between the status of women and the incidence of rape, but finding
no support for this hypothesis in their results). MacKinnon and Dworkin have based
much of their work on the belief that the subjugation of women in society leads directly
to a high rate of rape. See supra note 1.
108. The lower thep value, the more certain we can be that the statistical relationship
is not spurious. Thus, p < .001 is more significant thanp < .05. R' is a measure of the
amount of variation in rape rates explained by the equation. An R2 of .80 or more is
considered excellent in social science research.
109. The marginal or partial correlation is limited to the particular equation because
it reflects the best statistical fit with the dependent variable minus the remainder of the
equation. Thus, it is possible for an independent variable to be positively correlated
with the dependent variable when other independent variables are included in an equa-
[VOL. 52:122
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negative marginal correlation means a link with lower rates. The





Rate as Dependent Variable
Independent variable
1 SMCX
2 UCR homicide rate
3 UCR aggravated assault rate
4 SWX
5 UCR robbery rate
6 % resident in SMSAs
7 % black
8 % below poverty income level
9 % male of population, age 18-24
10 males per 100 females, age 15-24
























# 1 Composite circulation rate, soft-core sex magazines.
#4 Composite measure of the status of women. 
1 0
#6 Percentage of state population living in standard
metropolitan statistical areas.
#7 Percentage of state population that is African-American.
#8 Percentage of state population below poverty line.
#9 Percentage of state population age 18-24."'
#10 Ratio of males to females, age 15-24.
With the exception of robbery and gender, all variables in Ta-
ble 4 have a p < .05 and are, therefore, significantly related to
tion, but to be negatively correlated if regressed against the dependent variable alone
(or negatively correlated in the equation and positively correlated when regressed
alone).
110. The Status of Women Index (SWX) "uses 22 indicators of sexual equality,
covering four key aspects of society: economic, educational, political, and legal." Baron
& Straus, supra note 1, at 194 n.3.
111. The Baron and Straus table actually shows this variable to be "% Male of
population age 18-24." Id. at 200 tbl. 7.5. This is most likely a misprint; the text states
this variable as "percentage age 18-24." Id. at 193. Variable # 10 is also a measure of
gender, and there would appear to be no reason to introduce two gender variables into
the same equation. Larry Baron stated in a telephone conversation that he, too,
believed that the statement of the variable in Table 7.5 was a misprint. Telephone
Interview with Larry Baron (Apr. 8, 1991).
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rape." l2 Some of the significant correlations, although valid, are
probably noncausal. For example, no one would claim that murder
or aggravated assault causes rape or (if the correlation had been sig-
nificant) that robbery prevents rape."t 3 Similarly, while living in an
urban area makes it easier to commit stranger rape-because the
pool of strangers is obviously much larger-it may not represent a
causal connection." 1 4
A surprise in the Baron and Straus equation is the positive, sig-
nificant correlation between the incidence of rape and the status of
women-that is, higher status of women was statistically correlated
with higher rape rates. This result, which is contrary to suggestions
in the feminist literature, 1 5 could be explained as a form of "male
backlash" against the rapid emergence of women in our society dur-
ing the 1970s. Under this theory, some men could be using rape as
a way of maintaining a position of power over women." 6
Baron and Straus' alternative hypothesis, however, seems more
plausible. "High status" likely correlates with high self-esteem and,
thus, with a stronger sense of the importance of personal autonomy.
Women who fit this description might be more likely to report a
rape in order to assert or vindicate their personal autonomy. A
higher reporting rate in these high-status states would result in a
positive correlation between high status and the UCR rape rates that
112. When I attempted to replicate the Baron and Straus equation using equivalent
data sets from the same years they used, the link between rape rates and two additional
variables-age and poverty-was nonsignificant. These differences, of course, may be
the result of an inadvertent use of data sets different from those used by Baron and
Straus. The other p values, however, were similar to those found by Baron and Straus,
including the p value for SMCX.
113. The robbery variable came close to being significant atp < .052 and the correla-
tion was negative. The negative relationship between robbery rates and rape rates poten-
tially supports the view that rape is a crime of violence rather than a sexual crime. See
Baron & Straus, supra note 1, at 189 (noting the feminist argument that sex is a crime of
violence and citing several sources). Robbery might be different from murder and ag-
gravated assault, which are positively related to rape, in that robbery is an instrumental
crime-one that is committed in order to achieve a tangible goal (the acquisition of
money) rather than an emotional goal.
114. But see David Jaffee and Murray A. Straus, Sexual Climate and Reported Rape. A State-
Level Analysis, 16 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAv. 107, 120 (1987) (tentatively concluding
that urbanization is a form of "social disorganization" that may be a causal factor lead-
ing to an increased incidence of rape). The causal argument is stronger for poverty than
urbanization because it is easier to see poverty as a manifestation of social disorganiza-
tion. See id. (concluding that poverty is another manifestation of social disorganization
that may be causally related to rape rates).
115. See supra note 1.
116. See DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, THE PoLrrIcS OF RAPE: THE VICTIM'S PERSPECTIVE 14
(1975) ("More threatened male egos may mean more rape.").
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is attributable to the reporting distortion.' 17
The correlation in the Baron and Straus study between "soft-
core" sex magazine circulation (SMCX) and rape rates was ex-
tremely significant (p < .001). The 1986 Meese Commission on
Pornography relied, in large part, on the work of Baron and Straus
to conclude that a "highly significant, and not obviously spurious
relationship exists" between these variables."' But as the remain-
der of this Article shows, obvious or not, the relationship is very
likely to be spurious because SMCX is less likely a causal force than
a proxy for gender and sexual liberalism.
1. The Gender Link.-Baron and Straus restricted the gender
variable to the fifteen- to twenty-four-year-old age group because it
was their "target group"-the group that was most likely to rape
and be raped. 1" 9 But a better way to test whether readership of sex
magazines is serving as a proxy for a correlation between gender
and rape rates is to use gender in the total population.' 20 As Table
5 illustrates, when the broader measure of gender is substituted for
the fifteen- to twenty-four-year-old variable, the correlation of the
SMCX variable with rape rates falls to nonsignificance, while most of
the other variables retain about the same relationship to rape
rates. 121
117. See Baron & Straus, supra note 1, at 206 (positing that the tendency for rape rates
to increase with the status of women indicates a "reporting effect" rather than a "true
relationship").
118. MEESE COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 155. Baron and Straus were more cautious
in drawing conclusions from their study than was the Meese Commission. See Baron &
Straus, supra note 1, at 206-07 (noting the possibility that the correlation is caused by an
"unspecified third variable" and, therefore, that "the rape rate would not be altered if
sex magazines did not exist").
119. Telephone Interview with Larry Baron, supra note 111.
120. My calculations show that the level of pornographic magazine readership is more
highly correlated with the percentage of males in the total population than with the
percentage of males in the 15-24 age group.
121. In addition to SMCX, poverty and age also show very different correlations with
rape rates when comparing my figures with those of Baron and Straus. See infra Table 5.
But this may be because I inadvertently used different data sets for poverty and age. See
supra note 112. If so, it is not surprising that they continue to show a different relation-
ship with rape rates.
The broader gender measure suffers from multicollinearity, meaning that it is
strongly correlated with other independent variables. While multicollinearity is some-
times a reason to be skeptical of multiple regression results, it is to be expected when
using interdependent variables. Because many more men than women commit violent
crimes or read pornographic magazines, a gender measure should correlate strongly
with these variables as well as with the dependent rape variable. Moreover, if men older
than 24 are more likely to do some of these things than men 15-24, a measure of gender
1993]
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TABLE 5
Equation with New Gender Variable (# 1OA)




Ind. variable P correlation P < correlation
1 SMCX .321 pos. .001 pos.
2 UCR homicide rate .001 pos. .001 pos.
3 UCR assault rate .001 pos. .001 pos.
4 SWX .004 pos. .014 pos.
5 UCR robbery rate .112 neg. .052 neg.
6 % SMSA .001 pos. .001 pos.
7 % black .011 neg. .001 neg.
8 % poverty .078 pos. .011 pos.
9 % age, 18-24 .489 pos. .019 neg.
10 % male, 15-24 .090 pos.
10A % male, total .040 pos.
population
R 2 .87 R 2 .83
#1 Composite circulation rate, soft-core sex magazines.
#4 Composite measure of the status of women.1
2 2
#6 Percentage of state population living in standard
metropolitan statistical areas.
#7 Percentage of state population that is African-American.
#8 Percentage of state population below poverty line.
#9 Percentage of state population age 18-24.123
#10 Ratio of males to females, age 15-24.
#10A Ratio of males to females, total population.
2. The Sexual Liberalism Link.-As Baron and Straus recognized,
another variable for which SMCX could be a proxy is sexual liber-
alism.' 24 Both rape rates and pornographic magazine circulation
in the entire population will create more multicollinearity than the 15-24 age group
gender measure.
122. See supra note 110.
123. See supra note I11.
124. See Baron & Straus, supra note 1, at 207 ("[S]tates that provide a more relaxed
and casual atmosphere for sexual relations may also produce conditions that make men
more comfortable buying sex magazines."). The "sexual liberalism" term comes from
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could be byproducts of a sexually liberal atmosphere. This could
occur in two very different ways. Sexual liberalism may actually lead
to more rapes.' 25 Or rape victims in sexually liberal states may be
more likely to report rapes. If either or both of these phenomena
occur frequently, the data would show a correlation between rape
and sexual liberalism. In addition, pornographic magazine circula-
tion should also be correlated with sexual liberalism. Thus, an
equation that lacks a measure of sexual liberalism might produce
a proxy correlation between rape and pornographic magazine
circulation.
Measuring sexual liberalism is a difficult task, but church mem-
bership could serve as a rough, negative proxy for this variable. If a
state has a high rate of church membership, its citizens are likely to
be less sexually liberal. As Table 6 illustrates, church membership
and the broader gender measure, when introduced into the Baron
and Straus equation, cause a radical change in the SMCX
correlation.
As hypothesized, the church membership variable has a very
significant negative correlation with rape rates (p < .013). In
addition, it further reduces the significance of the correlation be-
tween the SMCX variable and rape rates, 126 which is now so insignif-
icant that the SMCX variable can be removed from the
Jaffee and Straus. While they do not precisely define the term, they note that it is "the
degree of sexual liberalism, openness, or permissiveness that exists in a state as mea-
sured by attitudes toward sex-related issues." See Jaffee and Straus, supra note 114, at
109.
125. It "might make some men feel sexually deprived relative to others and promote
the belief that they are entitled to sex even if it means using coercion or force to obtain
it." Baron & Straus, supra note 1, at 207.
126. But cf.Jaffee & Straus, supra note 114, at 117 (using a much more complex sexual
liberalism measure and concluding that its inclusion in the evaluation did nothing to
alter the significance of the soft-core pornographic magazine circulation (SMCX) varia-
ble). Because the church membership variable radically reduces the significance of the
SMCX variable, it may be measuring some other social aspect instead of (or, more likely,
in addition to) sexual liberalism. This "something else" could be the level of social
control-that is, the ability of church members to follow rules of all sorts. See Steven
Stack & Mary Jeane Kanacy, The Effect of Religion on Forcible Rape: A Structural Analysis, 22
J. SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 67 (1983). The key point, however, is that whatever church
membership is measuring, when the variable is not entered into the equation, SMCX
appears to be serving as its negative proxy. Thus, some of the correlation Baron and
Straus found between rape rates and SMCX properly belongs to this "social control"
variable.
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TABLE 6
Equation with Church Membership (#11)
and New Gender Variable (# 1OA)




Ind. Variable p < correlation P correlation
1 SMCX .553 pos. .001 pos.
2 UCR homicide rate .001 pos. .001 pos.
3 UCR assault rate .001 pos. .001 pos.
4 SWX .004 pos. .014 pos.
5 UCR robbery rate .137 neg. .052 neg.
6 % SMSA .001 pos. .001 pos.
7 % black .002 neg. .001 neg.
8 % poverty .035 pos. .011 pos.
9 % age, 18-24 .835 pos. .019 neg.
10 % male, 15-24 .090 pos.
10A % male, total .132 pos.
population
11 church membership .013 neg.
R 2 =.89 R2 =.83
#1 Composite circulation rate, soft-core sex magazines.
#4 Composite measure of the status of women.1
2 7
#6 Percentage of state population living in standard
metropolitan statistical areas.
#7 Percentage of state population that is African-American.
#8 Percentage of state population below poverty line.
#9 Percentage of state population age 18-24.128
#10 Ratio of males to females, age 15-24.
# 10A Ratio of males to females, total population.
#11 Percentage of state population claiming church
membership. '
29
127. See supra note 110.
128. See supra note 111.
129. Derived by combining Christian Church members, 1980, with Jewish population,
1986, and dividing by the state's population. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. at 55 tbl. 79 (108th ed. 1988).
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equation without loss of explanatory power.13 0  This finding
confirms the results of a later study by Baron and Straus in which
they also found no significant correlation between SMCX and rape
rates when the equation also contained a variable based on
"violence approval."' 3'1 Perhaps church membership is a rough,
negative proxy for "violence approval." This would explain why the
addition of either variable reduces the significance of the correlation
between the SMCX variable and rape rates. Alternatively, "violence
approval" and church membership may measure quite different
aspects of our culture, with SMCX serving as a proxy for both
aspects. In either case, the equation in Table 6 suggests what Baron
and Straus now accept: the significant correlation they found in
their 1984 study between sex magazine circulation rates and rape
rates is actually a proxy for other correlations and, thus,
unmeaningful.' 3 2
In 1986, the Meese Commission on Pornography proclaimed
that evidence in three studies strongly suggested a causal link
between pornography and rape.13 3 But none of these studies fully
130. Removing SMCX from an equation that contains all the Table 6 variables does
not change the R2 (or explanatory power) of the equation. Professor David Edelman,
University of Sydney, concluded that the best equation from a statistician's perspective is
one without either SMCX or the age variable because neither variable seemed to be
explaining variations in the rape rates. Communication from David Edelman, May 20,
1992.
131. See Baron & Straus, supra note 3, at 482 n.13 ("This finding supports the view
that the correlation between pornography and rape [is dependent on] an underlying
variable such as hypermasculinity."). Introducing a church membership variable into
the original Baron and Straus equation with its gender variable limited to the 15-24 age
group also has the effect of reducing the SMCX variable from strongly significant (p <
.001) to marginally significant (p < .046).
132. See supra note 131. Despite finding a statistically significant correlation in their
study, Jaffee and Straus also concluded that the link is probably noncausal. See Jaffee &
Straus, supra note 114, at 121 ("[I]t is the joint dependence of sex magazine readership
and rape on hyper-masculinity, rather than the influence of exposure to sexually explicit
materials per se, that produces the correlation between sex magazine readership and
rape."). See also Joseph E. Scott & Loretta A. Schwalm, An Examination of Adult Theater
Rates and Rape Rates by State, in CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN CRIME AND JUSTICE 40-53
(Joseph E. Scott & Travis Hirschi eds., 1988) (finding an insignificant correlation of p <
.543 between the number of adult theaters and rape rates).
133. See MEESE COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 944-45 (citing Baron & Straus, supra
note 1); id. at 948 (citing Jaffee & Straus, supra note 114); id. (citing Joseph E. Scott &
Loretta A. Schwalm, Rape Rates and the Circulation Rates of Adult Magazines, 24 J. SEX RES.
241 (1988) (the Commission used a preliminary version)). Indeed, the Meese
Commission implicitly criticized Jaffee and Straus for their caution in drawing
conclusions from the correlational data. See id. at 151 (noting that Jaffee and Straus
"continue to hold out hope-against all the evidence mentioned in the previous
paragraph-that a relationship between [another variable] and rape rates would render
the sex-magazine correlation spurious"). But compare HAWKINS & ZIMRING, supra note 65,
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controlled for the possibility that the correlation was merely a proxy
for a correlation between rape rates and gender or rape rates and
sexual liberalism.' 3 4 An equation that includes a broad gender
variable and a church membership variable produces a correlation
between pornographic magazine circulation and rape rates which is
more than fifty percent likely to be caused by chance.' 3 5
In addition, this study raises the question of whether non-legal
forms of social control, such as religion, may act to repress rape
rates or crime rates generally. But because the purpose here was to
test the link between pornography and rape, those questions are left
for another day.
IV. CONCLUSION
To conclude that pornography has no measurable causal con-
nection with rape is not, of course, to conclude that it might not
have an effect that we lack the tools to measure. Perhaps only cer-
tain kinds of pornography cause rape. Much of the current research
is directed at the sub-universe of violent pornography.' 36 Because
no data exist on the distribution of that sub-universe of pornogra-
phy, its relation to actual rape rates is impossible to test. Moreover,
if only violent pornography has a causal link with rape, the link may
be with the portrayal of violence rather than sex. As Steven Chil-
dress has concluded with respect to harmful effect, "Of sex, sexual
violence, and violence, the least of these is sex."' 137
Of course, even if no type of pornography has an effect on rape
rates-or if pornography actually depresses rape rates-one may
favor restricting pornography on other grounds.
at 99 (criticizing the "almost schizophrenic dissociation" between the Commission's
findings and the research it relied on); Scott & Schwalm, supra, at 242-43 (noting that
the Commission tended to reach conclusions "based on little scientific evidence but
rather strong personal feelings").
134. The Scott and Schwalm study omitted any gender variable at all, thus creating a
strong possibility that correlations between rape rates and pornographic magazine
circulation are simply a proxy for the ratio of males to females in state populations. See
Scott & Schwalm, supra note 133, at 246 (finding statistically significant correlations
between rape rates and three variables: circulation of sex magazines, poverty levels, and
the percent of a state considered to be a standard metropolitan area).
135. See supra Table 6 (indicating p < .553).
136. See, e.g., MEESE COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 323-29 (finding a causal relation-
ship between violent pornography and sexual violence); Check & Guloien, supra note 89
(comparing the effects of violent pornography, degrading or dehumanizing pornogra-
phy, and "socially acceptable" erotica).
137. Childress, supra note 65, at 212.
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The purpose of this Article, however, was to assess empirically
the "anti-pornography" syllogism. Two types of evidence would
support the syllogism's conclusion that pornography causes rape.
One type would be an increase in rape rates that is roughly propor-
tional to the increased consumption of pornography. Although the
data used to measure these phenomena are imperfect, no evidence
of this type was found. The UCR rape rates have increased much
more slowly than the measured increase in pornography consump-
tion, and the arguably more reliable NCS rape rates have generally
moved in a direction opposite that of pornography consumption.
The second type of supporting evidence would be a significant
correlation between rape rates in the fifty states and pornographic
magazine distribution. But this Article has demonstrated that previ-
ously found correlations between pornographic magazines and rape
rates are not credible. Thus, the best evidence that exists (and it is
far from perfect) does not support the empirical claim that pornog-
raphy causes rape. Because pornography, as defined in this Arti-
cle,"' may include some constitutionally protected speech or
expression, 3 9 even somewhat imperfect evidence warrants full con-
sideration on the question of whether to ban pornography. 40 Until
better evidence is available, caution dictates that we refuse to act on
the unproven empirical claim that pornography causes rape.
138. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
139. Non-obscene pornography is protected by the First Amendment. See Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (defining obscene material as that depicting "pa-
tently offensive" sexual conduct, appealing to the "prurient interest," and lacking "seri-
ous literary, artistic, political, or scientific value").
140. Recent efforts to legislate against pornography rely on definitions that have a
very different focus from the definition of obscenity provided by the Supreme Court. See
DowNs, supra note 5, at 114-15 (quoting Minneapolis and Indianapolis ordinances that
focus on depictions of women as sexual objects). At a minimum, the different defini-
tions raise the possibility that some pornography would be non-obscene under the
Court's current test and, thus, protected by the First Amendment.
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